As any economist who went to graduate school in the 1960s and 1970s knows, the automobile industry was a large component of the macroeconomic forecasting models that were then being created. Today, the economic uncertainties facing General Motors and its major parts supplier, Delphi Corporation, offer a different kind of forecast: we have to reconfigure how Americans pay for health insurance.
Health care costs (as well as retiree health care costs) are now a larger fraction of a worker's total compensation package than they were a generation ago, and the rate at which that fraction is increasing is not sustainable in the current economic climate. We can stand back and let market forces operate, with the likely result that a significant number of currently insured workers (and their dependents) will join the ranks of the uninsured by the end of this decade. Alternatively, we can start working now on a plan to alter the way we finance health insurance and the role that employers have in contributing to the costs of health insurance.
Perspective on Health Benefits and Compensation
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported in March that employer costs for employee compensation averaged $26.46 per hour worked in December 2005 (BLS 2006b). Of this, wages and salaries averaged $18.59, and benefits averaged $7.87; thus benefits accounted for almost 30% of compensation per hour worked. Payroll taxes for required benefits such as Social Security and Medicare accounted for 8.1% of the $26.46, and health benefits were the second highest share of compensation at 7.6%. To be sure, these averages mask a lot of variation, particularly since only 53% of workers in private industry receive health benefits where they work (BLS 2005) .
Moreover, these numbers are just the employer's costs for the various benefits included in total compensation. According to Jon Gabel and colleagues, workers paid on average 16% of the total premium cost for individual coverage, and 26% of the total cost for family coverage (Gabel et al. 2005) .
Nonetheless, contrast these numbers with what GM and Delphi are paying in total compensation for their workers who are members of the United Auto Workers (UAW). On average, wages are almost $28 an hour; the total compensation is in some dispute but is estimated to be between $67 and $79 per hour. Delphi is in bankruptcy, and in court documents filed March 31, the company stated that the total compensation it was paying its UAW workers was $78.63 per hour, factoring in pensions, health care costs, and other benefits. Industry analysts and UAW officials estimate that the total costs are closer to $67 per hour (Maynard 2006 ). It appears that the health benefits costs of UAW retirees are included in the benefits costs -something not in the total of benefits costs reported by the BLS. Also, the UAW employees at Delphi and GM have not been paying anything toward the costs of their health insurance, although that will change under the new agreements worked out by GM and the UAW. (GM's retirees, for the first time, will pay part of their health insurance premiums under the new contract, at an annual cost of $752 per family [Bloomberg News 2006] ). However, even after netting out those costs, it is clear that the compensation of UAW members is far larger than that of the average worker, as reported by the BLS. Given the competition that GM and Delphi are facing, it is not surprising that they are asking for large concessions in the wages and benefits they pay workers.
The demands for labor concessions at GM and Delphi are not unique; Ford Motor Company, major airlines, and other large companies with long-standing labor agreements also are trying to reduce their labor costs, especially their health and pension outlays. The same is true of the public sector, where health insurance costs now account for more than 10% of total compensation on average (BLS 2006b). Starting this year, the public sector has to comply with changes in accounting rules regarding retiree health benefits; now, both the private and public sectors must show they are placing funds in accounts to pay for benefits promised to retirees in the future.
The lesson from all this is that employers are being squeezed by the costs of health benefits and are seeking ways to reduce those costs. Some of the better-known companies trying to reduce their labor costs have played significant roles in the American economy over the last half century, and some have large shares of the country's dwindling number of unionized workers. In response to competitive pressures, some of these companies will have to restructure their production methods, and perhaps some will not survive. Other changes already are evident; employersponsored coverage as the dominant source of health insurance in the United States is declining rapidly -the percentage of employers offering health insurance benefits fell from 69% in 2000 to just 60% in 2005 (Gabel et al. 2005) . It is clear we need to create a new structure for financing health insurance.
Goals of Restructuring Payments for Health Insurance
Two goals should be front and center in designing a new structure for financing health insurance. One is that paying for health insurance is a responsibility to be shared between individuals and companies. Individuals (workers and nonworkers) need to have a stake in efforts to restrain health care spending; we know that when people must pay for insurance, they think about the costs of health care. The amount that an individual should be required to pay for coverage should vary by income, so low-income individuals would pay less than high-income people. Companies also should contribute to health insurance costs; they benefit enormously from a healthy workforce, and therefore should share the responsibility of paying for health care.
The second goal is assurance that the new financing structure not affect employer hiring decisions. We do not want to create incentives for employers to discriminate against job applicants who might be more expensive in terms of their health care use (diabetics or middle-age people perhaps). We also do not want to create incentives to hire workers on a temporary basis merely to avoid paying for health coverage. Currently, for example, most employers pay a fixed amount per worker. This is equivalent to a head tax on workers, and provides a greater disincentive for employers to hire low-wage workers than highwage workers. The fixed cost is independent of a worker's productivity or value to the company, making employers particularly conscious of the fixed cost as a fraction of total compensation for workers whose wages are low.
Thus, we might envision a financing system not very different from what we have now for people with employer-sponsored health coverage. It would have a structure in which individuals and companies share the costs of health insurance. Imagine the following as an example. For people working in an employer group, the individual's premium contribution would depend on the health plan chosen by the person, while the employer's contribution would be based solely on the person's income (similar to the Medicare payroll tax). Self-employed or non-working individuals similarly would pay a premium contribution based on the health plan they chose, but would pay a second, additional premium contribution based on their earnings (if self-employed) or their non-wage income and assets (if not working). These additional premiums and the employer contributions would go to a central fund, which could receive further funding based on corporate and personal income taxes to help pay for the costs of low-income people. The central fund would be responsible for sending payments to the insurance plans in proportion to the number of people who had chosen each plan, and the payments to the insurance plans could be adjusted on the basis of age, sex, and other information. It also could retain some of the money, assuming the role of reinsurer to cover the majority of costs for people whose expenses were in the top 1% of the spending distribution. The Netherlands instituted a similar structure for paying for health insurance this past January -an example that provides food for thought about how we might redesign the way we finance health insurance in the United States.
Propose Alternative Financing Structures
GM's need to immediately restructure its labor costs (among other things) is a wake-up call to policymakers and those of us in the research community to once again examine various alternatives for financing health insurance. Estimating the distributional effects of different ways for individuals and businesses to share the costs of health insurance should be part of such an evaluation, as should varying the cost-sharing that is required of people when they use medical care.
Developing a new financing structure does not mean that we have to create a single-payer health insurance system. We easily could have a choice of private health insurance plans so people could opt for any plan they prefer. (In the Netherlands people can choose from about 25 different private insurers.) Also, by retaining businesses' involvement in the financing of health care, we would ensure an incentive for companies to help determine ways to restrain health care spending.
Discussions of alternative financing structures have been absent from debates about health insurance since the Clinton health reform proposal failed. But in the decade since, health care spending has doubled (Smith et al. 2006 ) and employers have been moving to reduce their role in financing health care. We in the health policy community should take the lead in proposing new alternatives for financing health insurance in this country.
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